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Abstract
The paper explains the growth — inequality nexus for China’s provinces.
The theoretical model of provincial development consists of two regions
and studies the interactions of a mutually depending development process.
Due to positive externalities, incoming trade and FDI induce imitation
and hence productivity growth. The regional government can inﬂuence
the economy by changing international transaction costs and providing
public infrastructure. Due to mobile domestic capital, disparity eﬀects
are reinforced. The implications of the theoretical model are tested. As
the central intention of the paper is to explain provincial disparity we
directly relate income disparity (indicated by the contribution to the per
capita income Theil index) to the disparity of selected income determining
factors (indicated by the contribution to every other Theil index of the
determinants). We examine the determinants of income and inequality for
28 Chinese provinces over the period 1991-2004 and apply a ﬁxed eﬀects
panel estimation. Our analysis is based on revised GDP and investment
data from Hsueh and Li (1999) and various sources of Chinese oﬃcial sta-
tistics provided by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). The results
conﬁrm the theoretical framework and suggest a direct linkage between
the factors that determine regional income and regional disparity. More
speciﬁc, it is apparent that trade, foreign and domestic capital and govern-
ment expenditure have an impact on the provincial inequality. Moreover,
it is the success of the coastal regions and hence potentially geography
with the low international transaction costs that drives the provincial in-
equality of China.
JEL Classiﬁcation: J24, O14, O18, O33, O40, R55
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China’s provincial disparities and the
determinants of provincial inequality
The paper explains the growth — inequality nexus for China’s provinces.
The theoretical model of provincial development consists of two regions and
studies the interactions of a mutually depending development process. Due
to positive externalities, incoming trade and FDI induce imitation and hence
productivity growth. The regional government can inﬂuence the economy by
changing international transaction costs and providing public infrastructure.
Due to mobile domestic capital, disparity eﬀects are reinforced. The implications
of the theoretical model are tested. As the central intention of the paper is
to explain provincial disparity we directly relate income disparity (indicated
by the contribution to the per capita income Theil index) to the disparity of
selected income determining factors (indicated by the contribution to every other
Theil index of the determinants). We examine the determinants of income and
inequality for 28 Chinese provinces over the period 1991-2004 and apply a ﬁxed
eﬀects panel estimation. Our analysis is based on revised GDP and investment
data from Hsueh and Li (1999) and various sources of Chinese oﬃcial statistics
provided by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). The results conﬁrm the
theoretical framework and suggest a direct linkage between the factors that
determine regional income and regional disparity. More speciﬁc, it is apparent
that trade, foreign and domestic capital, and government expenditure have an
impact on the provincial inequality. Moreover, it is the success of the coastal
regions and hence potentially geography with the low international transaction
costs that drives the provincial inequality of China.
Keywords: regional development, FDI, international integration, China
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Since the implementation of economic reforms and opening up to the world
market, China experienced a continuously high rate of annual growth. The un-
precedented boom in foreign direct investment (FDI), and the sustained increase
in trade were of impressive dimensions. This positive economic development in-
duced an enormous improvement in the standard of living for China and had
an important impact on the global economy regarding the eﬀect of foreign in-
vestment decisions and international trade. However, a diﬀerent aspect of this
economic success story was a rising inequality within the country and lasting
poverty in rural areas. Numerous studies on this topic reﬂect the importance
of this problem. Analyzing the economic development of the coast, the interior
and the rural and urban provinces Kanbur and Zhang (2005), Huang, Kuo and
Kao (2003), Li and Zhao (1999) and Wan (1998) ﬁnd statistical evidence for
rising inequality indicated by increasing provincial disparities.
What are the sources of the rising provincial disparity? In the 1950s al-
ready Kuznets assumed a relationship between average income and inequality
and found evidence for an inverted U-curve relation between these variables.
A couple of papers (Paukert 1973, Ahluwalia 1976, Carter and Chenery 1976)
supported this inverted U-hypothesis across countries at diﬀerent development
levels, however, recent studies using other econometric methods and longer data
periods ﬁnd evidence against the Kuznets hypothesis. For example, Deininger
and Squire (1996) ﬁnd no evidence of the Kuznets curve in 90 percent of the
cases and argue that there is no clear relationship between income growth and
inequality. This results are consistent with the ﬁndings of several authors in-
cluding Dollar and Kraay (2005), Chen and Ravallion (1997), and Easterly
(1999).The results of Ravillion (2003) are also diﬀerent than the Kuznets curve.
He identiﬁes a positive relationship between income growth and absolute dis-
parities between the "rich" and the "poor". Beside income a couple of other
factors are assumed to have an impact on disparity. A number of recent papers
have found evidence that openness is associated with higher inequality. Barro
(1999) and Spilimbergo et. al. (1999) ﬁnd that trade is signiﬁcantly positively
associated with inequality and Lundberg and Squire (2000) ﬁnd that an increase
from zero to one in the Sachs-Warner openness index is associated with a signif-
icant 9.5 point increase in the Gini index. Concerning the government activities
and human capital the results of Fan et. al. (2002) show that government’s
production-enhancing investments, such as agricultural research and develop-
ment, irrigation, expenditure on education and infrastructure contributed not
only to agricultural production growth, but also to reduction of rural poverty
and provincial inequality. To conclude, those results make clear that inequality
is a complex phenomenon and has many sources and factors of inﬂuence.
To get a general impression of disparity in China and the provincial contribu-
tion to this inequality we calculate the Theil index1 and focus on the composition























Figure 1: Chinas’ Theil index and the provincial contribution
of this index.
As a ﬁrst step we show the development of the total Theil index and the
contributions of the most important provinces for disparity. Figure 1 presents
the results for the postreform period from 1978 to 2004. Starting with a value
of 0.19 in 1978 the Theil index fell below a value of 0.15 in 1990. Since this
point the situation turned, the inequality increased consistently and reached
the value of 0.17 in 2004. Hence, the postreform period can be divided into two
subperiodes: 1) the period from 1978 to 1990 where inequality decreased, and
2) the period since 1990 where inequality increased. Furthermore, the overall
Theil index is fragmented by the provinces’ contributions.
The composition reveals that the provinces do not contribute to the country’s
inequality to the same degree. In ﬁgure 1 we present only the six provinces
with the highest contribution to the Theil index, all other provinces have a
contribution lower than 0.02 or even negative. Especially the eastern provinces,
in particular the contribution of Shanghai inﬂates the Theil index to a high
degree, the central and western provinces show only a minor impact on the
degree of the index. This indicates that the inter-provincial inequality in China
is driven mainly by a few rich provinces.
In a next step, we analyse the inequality contribution of China’s eastern,
province i, x is the mean income, and n is the number of provinces. The contribution of each
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central and western region2. Therefore, we decomposed the Theil index, where
we account for the weighted average of inequality within the three regions, plus

























Figure 2: Decomposition of China’s Theil index
Figure 2 presents the decomposition of the regional Theil index. The devel-
oping of the decomposed index shows a similar view. The three regions do not
contribute to the countries inequality in the same degree. The inequality within
the western region and the central region has only a slight impact. In particular,
the inequality within the eastern region and between the three regions drives the
Theil index.
Although we could not identify a falling trend to 1990, the rise in inequality
since 1990 is concurrent with the Theil index. Again, it becomes apparent that
the inequality is mainly caused by the rich eastern provinces, in particular by
the within eﬀect of the eastern provinces.
Therefore, the major goal of this paper is to explain provincial disparity in
2The provinces Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian,
Shandong, Guangdong and Guangxi are referred as eastern provinces, Shanxi, Jilin, Hei-
longjiang, Anhui, Jiagxi, Henan, Hubei, Hunan and Inner Mongolia belong to the central
region and Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia and Xinjiang are
the western provinces.









where the country is devided in m regions and sk i st h ei n c o m es h a r eo fr e g i o nk ,Tk is the
Theil index for that region, and xk is the average income in region k.China’s provincial disparities 6
China. The focus is not the income and growth process itself, but the process
leading to disparity is the phenomenon to understand. As theoretical approach
we introduce a two region model of development in which a change in inter-
national transaction costs will trigger disparity accelerating growth with two
mutually dependent processes. First, additional trade or FDI, and positive ex-
ternalities in one province will accelerate relative technological growth in this
province. Second, there is arbitrage of domestic capital towards the faster grow-
ing province. As an inﬂow of domestic capital and faster imitation and growth
of technologies are mutually favorable, an agglomerating process is initiated. In-
ternational and inter-regional factormobility reinforces the disparity. They are
positive in one province and negative in the other. Local policies do not only
eﬀect the province itself. Factor mobility, international and interprovincial,
will clearly have additional eﬀects on all provinces and on provincial disparity.
Generally, disparities in provincial income are caused by disparities in income
determining factors.
While in the standard income and growth regression only the existence of a
slope between the dependent and independent variable is important, explaining
disparity requires an additional information. As disparity measured in distances
is the target, the distance from the mean must be included in the measurement
concept. The Theil concept considers this requirement. Therefore, if we apply
the theoretical model above to standard income and growth regression analysis,
we can identify income and growth determining factors. However, we do not
know to what extend each of these factors is responsible for disparity. Therefore,
we relate income disparity (indicated by the contribution to the income Theil
index) to the disparity of selected income determining factors (indicated by
the contribution to each other Theil index). The empirical part identiﬁes the
determinants of inequality for 28 Chinese provinces over the period 1991-2004.
We apply a random eﬀects panel estimation. Our analysis is based on revised
GDP and investment data from Hsueh and Li (1999) and various sources of
Chinese oﬃcial statistics provided by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS).
2 A 3-equation model of provincial development
In case of a developing region, international spill-over and externalities through
FDI and trade, and infrastructure are relevant determinants of growth and devel-
opment.4 Taking these externalities and international spill-over as the starting
point, we develop a basically neoclassical model of growth for a single backward
province. Externalities will lead to temporary dynamic scale economies and
drive the technical imitation process. The dynamics of the model are driven not
by accumulation but by technological catching up and imitation. The model
is taken from Gries/Redlin (2008) and will be stylized and simpliﬁed in such a
way that a province can be modeled with three equations.
4See e.g. Fujita/Thisse (2002 ch.11), or Kelly/Hageman (1999).China’s provincial disparities 7
Final output: Final output of a province i uses human capital Hi, interna-
tional capital ﬂo w i n gi n t ot h ep r o v i n c ea sF D IFi and domestic real capital
Ki to produce a homogeneous ﬁnal good. Domestic capital and international
capital are supposed to be diﬀerent. Like in a Lewis Economy, labor is not a
growth restricting factor, and the Lewis turning point has not yet been reached.
Hence, Hi,K i and Fi can be regarded as the respective capital per unit labor.
Based on the small economy assumption and the integration of provincial ﬁnal
product markets into world markets, the per capita production of the ﬁnal good
yi can be deﬁned as Findlay’s foreign exchange production function5. yi is a pro-
duction value function measured in international prices. Each value of output
indicates a full specialization in the industry characterized by the corresponding
factor intensity. Inﬂowing international capital Fi is fully depreciated during
the period of inﬂux. Production of the ﬁnal product takes place under constant







with Ai = ωi/A.
In (1) Ai measures the level of technology in province i, and ωi is the province’s
relative technological position compared to the technology leader A which in-
creases at a given rate n. The domestic output is used for domestic consumption,
exports, and government expenditures which is the fraction γi of GDP.
FDI inﬂow and exports: Optimal capital inﬂows are determined by the
ﬁrms’ optimal factor demand. Due to the small economy assumption, capital
costs for international capital are determined by an exogenous world market
interest factor r6 and an ad valorem factor for international transaction costs
τi which is speciﬁc for each proivince. τex
i is a transaction cost parameter
for exports. τi and τex
i are modeled as iceberg costs on exports. Returns on
international capital investments in a province will be fully repatriated, exports
Exi must earn international interest rates and all international transaction costs.
On the ﬁrm or provincial level each province needs to export a corresponding
value to pay for international capital costs connected to the province’s FDI
ExF
i (1 − τex
i )=τirFi.S o l v i n gt h eﬁrms’ optimization problem7 we obtain the















5See Findlay (1973, 1984).
6The interest factor is one + interest rate.
7The ﬁrm has to determine optimal factor inputs by maximizing proﬁts. Since all capital
services have to be paid in terms of exports, the full capital costs include several components
like government taxes on output γi or transaction costs for exports.China’s provincial disparities 8
To simplify, international borrowing or lending beyond FDI is excluded.
We also assume that foreign exchange reserves are not transferred between
provinces. Therefore, international capital costs have to be paid by provin-
cial exports. Additional exports are required to ﬁnance imports of the province.




= εi =( 1− λ)[1− (1 − τex
i )β](1− γi)
Whereas the export share of GDP is simply determined by the elasticity of
production of foreign capital β and the tax rate γi (2). Including optimal capital






















As we do not want to consider scale eﬀects from technological leaders, production
is now normalized for the international technology level.9 Therefore, produc-
tion is determined by provincial factor endowments and the relative technology
position of the province compared to the technological leader ωi.
Technology and imitation: The developing province acquires technologies
by imitating foreign designs from international technology leaders. International
knowledge spill-over and positive technological externalities from the inﬂux of
FDI are included at a macro level of modeling. In order to make spill-over
from FDI eﬀective for the host province, technology and ﬁrm-relevant public
infrastructure must exist. As the focus lies on underdeveloped provinces the
case of innovations in this backward province is excluded. The imitation process
is aﬀected by the technology gap (1−ω) between the backward province and the
industrialized world. If the domestic stock of technology is low (ω is small), it is
relatively easy to improve the technology by imitating foreign designs. However,
the process becomes increasingly diﬃcult as the technology gap narrows.
The endogenous process of imitation and participation in worldwide tech-
nical progress is determined by pure externalities from FDI or trade indicated
by exports and from domestic government investments in the ability to imitate
and improve productivity.10 Externalities in the imitation process generate tem-
8The households decision prob lem is described as:
max : U = Cλ Im1−λ,
s.t. :0 = y (1 − γi) − τirFi − Ci − pi(1 − τex
i )Im i
For the solution see appendix 1b.
9Yi = yiA
− 1
1−β . see also appendix 1a.
10As we would like to exclude pure scale eﬀects from technical progress of the technical leader
F(t)i and G(t)i and Exi are normalized values transformed by an international technology
index factor A(t)
1
1−β , and A is growing at a given constant rate n. See also appendix 1a..China’s provincial disparities 9
porary dynamic scale economies. We focus on the technical externalities from







i − ω(t). (3)
The externalities from FDI F(t) or exports Ex(t), and government infrastruc-
ture G(t) are assumed to have a rather limited eﬀect on imitation such that
δG + δF + δEx = δ<1 and δ is small.
As we abstract from government borrowing or lending and interprovincial
transfers government expenditures are restricted by tax income. Therefore, the
government budget constraint is
Gi = γiYi,E x i = εiyi
The three equations (1), (2), and (3) capture the model of provincial de-
velopment for one province. The solution to (1), (2), and (3) is a diﬀerential
equation determining the growth of the relative stock of technology available to
the province (catching-up in technology) during the period of transition to the
steady state.12 The economy can realize temporary dynamic scale economies
during this catching up and adjustment period. While ˙ ωi(t) is positive during
transition, it converges to zero when approaching the steady state path. Equa-
tion (4) suggests a decreasing speed of growth with a rising income level as a



























Not only the speed of technological catching up ˙ ωi(t) is determined by the
factor endowments Ki, Hi and the fractions γi and ϕi. For each endowment we
can determine the steady state position ω∗
i of the province. For ˙ ωi(t)=0 14 we
11For the dynamic catching-up-spill-over equation we assume that G and F and Ex are
suﬃciently large for positive upgrading.
12See appendix 1f.
13The dynamic catching-up-spill-over equation contains a scaling problem if H and K are
taken as absolute values. As the region is assumed to remain backward, the values of γ, ϕ, H
and K are assumed to be suﬃciently small. See appendix 2 for the derivatives.
14We assume that the contribution of FDI to production β as well as the externality eﬀect of
FDI on technology δ are suﬃciently small. This also reﬂects the already mentioned assumption








































δ(1 − β − α)




































































The essential determinants of the speed of convergence and the ﬁnal relative
convergence position are the endowment of capital Ki and human capital Hi,
technology relevant government expenditure indicated by γi, and international
(and domestic) transaction costs connected to exports τex
i and FDI τi and hence
the share of FDI ϕi.
3 Two provinces and provincial equilibrium
To analyze interprovincial factor mobility and the eﬀects on provincial disparity,
we need to look at two provinces i =1 ,2 in a country. Both provinces have





= −1 < 0. (11)
The mobility of domestic factors from one province into the other represents a
shift of resources.
As there is an interaction between the development position of a province
and the allocation of domestic capital, two conditions, the ﬁnal development
condition and the equilibrium condition for the domestic capital market (interest
parity condition), have to be considered.
Relative Regional Development: From equation (5) we know that ω∗
i is
the steady state position of each province. The relative steady state position
for the two provinces for a given endowment is15





















































< 0 for γ1 >γ ∗
1.
This condition is referred to as the ﬁnal development condition. The ﬁnal de-
velopment condition identiﬁes the relative technological position of a province
compared to the other province in steady state. In general, this relative ﬁnal
position depends on all parameters of ϕi ( s e e( 6 ) )a n di np a r t i c u l a ro nt h ea l -
location of the mobile factor K to the two provinces. Depending on K the
ﬁnal development condition can be drawn as ﬁnal development curve ΩD in the
K1 − Ω diagram (ﬁgure (3)).
Dynamic adjustment can be directly derived from the equation of motion
for each single province. Denoting ai as the distance of the province’s present
position relative to the steady state position (ai = ωi(t)/ω∗

























2 < 0 for Ω(t) > ΩD
For a1 >a 2 the present position of the two provinces Ω is above16 the ﬁnal




Regional factor mobility: In this model domestic capital is the only mobile
factor between provinces. As we assume perfect competition in the ﬁnal goods
market, domestic interest rates ii for domestic capital in each province i is
determined by marginal productivity18
lim
K1→0
















δ(1 − β − α)






























Figure 3: Steady state and dynamics
ii =



















The arbitrage process is not perfect, adjustment takes time. Gradual ad-





In a no-arbitrage equilibrium ˙ K1(t)=0 . Therefore, the potential interest




From condition (16) we can derive a curve describing all interest parity positions
of relative technological upgrading ΩIP.19
19For the derivative dΩM
















































We refer to this condition as the interest parity curve.T h e interest parity
curve20 is also drawn in ﬁgure 3. ΩIP intersects the origin with an inﬁnite
positive slope. With increasing K1 the slope starts positively, may become
negative and eventually turns positive such that ΩIP becomes inﬁnite when K1
approaches K [limK1→K ΩIP = ∞]21
Dynamic adjustment is shown in ﬁgure 3. If at a given endowment K1 in
province 1 relative productivity is presently smaller than required by the interest
parity-condition, domestic capital will move from province 1 and K1 decreases.
Therefore, at any point below the ΩIP curve domestic capital will ﬂow out of
province 1. This process is indicated by the horizontal arrows in ﬁgure 3.
Steady State: When both provinces are identical22 t h e r em u s tb ea tl e a s t
one equilibrium. Using the implicit function theorem we obtain an equilibrium
















At point B in ﬁgure 3 the two provinces are identical since K1 = K2 and
we consider a stable case. For stability the slope of the ﬁnal development curve







that is if δ<α . (19)
20For the reactions of the no migration curve see appendix 4c.
21The properties of the no-migration curve is given by limK1→0 ΩM =0 ,limK1→0
dΩM
dK1 =
∞,limK1→K ΩM = ∞,limK1→N
dΩM
dK1 = ∞. See also appendix 4.
22Identical regions are deﬁned as all parameters and factor endowments (including K1 = K2)
being identical.
23See appendix 4d.China’s provincial disparities 14
4 Endogenous Provincial Disparity
Preferential Policies and International Integration: For two provinces
the eﬀects of preferential policy for provincial disparity can be analyzed. We are
interested in the eﬀects of an non-symmetrical decrease in international trans-
action and information costs in one province. Many local conditions including
bureaucratic policies act like non-tariﬀ trade barriers. If a province reduces
international transaction and information costs, it may be able to generate a
decisive advantage over other provinces. A non-symmetrical reduction of in-
ternational transaction costs via preferential policy can be translated into the
model by dτ1 < 0 or dτex
1 < 0. As result, the ﬁnal development curve ΩD in ﬁg-
ure 3 shifts upward (see (12)) and the interest parity curve ΩIP shifts downward
(see (17))24. Starting from the original equilibrium point B0, the two provinces
will move towards the new equilibrium point B1. The existence of a number of
stable inner solutions allows for conditional convergence of provinces. Starting
from B0 we ﬁnd a stable provincial adjustment process.
The economic process is quite simple to describe. The change in interna-
tional transaction costs will trigger accelerating growth with two mutually de-
pendent processes. First, additional trade or FDI, and positive externalities in
one province will accelerate relative technological growth in this province. Sec-
ond, there is arbitrage of domestic capital towards the faster growing province.
As an inﬂow of domestic capital and faster imitation and growth of technologies
are mutually favorable, an agglomerating process is initiated. The internation-
ally more integrated province with more inﬂows of FDI and exports will strongly
improve its relative steady state position.
Factor Mobility, Agglomeration and Disparity: Since arbitrage and ag-
glomeration determine all other reactions, we start by analyzing the shift of








In province 1 the access to domestic capital will grow, while province 2 faces
a reduction and shrinks. Decreasing international transaction costs and bet-
ter access to international technologies in province 1 will increase technology
growth and trigger agglomeration advantages for this province. Faster imita-
tion increases productivity growth and an interest gap between the provinces
opens. As domestic capital moves between the two provinces, domestic capital
migrates to the high-productivity, high-interest province. Inﬂowing capital and
the resulting additional technological growth will both drive a process of accel-
eration and agglomeration. In this process, the success of one province is driven
at the expense of the other since one province absorbs domestic capital from
24In this ﬁgure ΩD shifts upwards and ΩIP shifts downwards. In order to keep the ﬁgure
simple, we draw the relative shift of the two curves instead of shifting both curves at the same
time.
25See appendix 5.China’s provincial disparities 15
the other to feed agglomeration. Technological acceleration endogenously ter-
minates when imitation becomes more diﬃcult and a province obtains more so-
phisticated technologies. Further, factor mobility to the agglomerating province
will eventually drive down interest rates by decreasing marginal productivity.
At the same time, emigrating domestic capital will drive up marginal produc-
tivity in the less favored province. Eventually, interest adjustment will equalize
arbitrage incentives between the two provinces.
Analyzing the determinants of disparity: The major focus of the paper
is to analyze income disparity between provinces. As a result of the model, we





yj ). This relative provincial income could be a ﬁrst indicator
of bilateral provincial disparity. With the theoretical model we can explain this












































+( 1− α − β)log
Ki
Kj
Further, using comparative statics, we obtain the eﬀects of policy diﬀerentials
on mobile factors and relative income. As an example for a policy, we analyze
the relative income reaction when international transaction costs are reduced
dy∗
1
dτ1. Using condition (11) for identical provinces, the reaction of the disparity
































































































































Income diﬀerentials between provinces are driven by three channels: a direct
improvement in technology h1i and two eﬀects from interprovincial arbitrage
h2i and h3i. Factor mobility of domestic capital drives up technological abilities
h2i and increases factor endowments and production capacity in the province
h3i. Both factor mobility eﬀects are mutually reinforcing. They are positive
in one province and negative in the other. Local policies do not only eﬀect the
province of activ policy itself. Factor mobility, international and interprovincial,
will clearly have additional eﬀects on all provinces and on provincial disparity.
Eﬀects of policies are not limited to the policy making province. These disparity
eﬀects are in the focus of the empirical study.
Up to this point we are still close to the standard income and growth analysis.
The only diﬀerence is that in this approach we add the provincial interactions
caused by provincial factor mobility. Factor mobility can be a substantial ad-
ditional disparity driving factor. Therefore, in contrast to the standard growth
regression it is not only interesting to identify the growth driving factors. We
would also like to know, if the growth driving factors are determining disparity
because they are diverging themselves. Which growth driving factor contributes
to income divergence because it is diverging itself. In other words, we would
like to identify the determinants of disparity directly.
The Table in ﬁgure 4 gives an overview of the most frequently used disparity
measures and the properties of each measure.26 This table shows that disparity
measures are expected to have an appropriate distance concept related to the
problem and certain properties like the weak transfer principal, scale indepen-
dence,o rw e l ldeﬁned interval. As the diﬀerent measures emphasize diﬀerent
aspects of disparity they are not equally suitable for all sorts of questions related
to disparity.
In this paper we would like to explain provincial income disparity (measured
by an appropriate disparity index) by the disparity of income determining fac-
tors. Since the Theil index is decomposable into the diﬀerent contributions of
each province to the country wide Theil index of provincial disparity, and since
it has an appropriate distance concept and all required properties, we choose the
Theil index as an appropriate instrument for the empirical analysis. More pre-
cise, we can determine each province’s Theil-contribution to income disparity.
All these provincial contributions add up to the overall measure of provincial
income disparity. Moreover, we will explain the Theil-contribution of income
26For more details see Cowell (2005).China’s provincial disparities 17
Measure Definition decompos . transfer scale interval
Variance V  1
n ∑yi − y ̄
2 yes strong no 0,y ̄ 2n − 1
Coeff. of Var. c  V1/2/y ̄ yes weak yes 0,n − 1
1/2







− 1 yes strong yes 0,




y ̄ yes strong yes 0,logn







yes weak yes 0,−n−/1−
Dalton yes weak no 0, 1−n1−
1−ny ̄1−
Herfindal H  1
n c2  1 yes strong no 0, 1
n
Gini G  1
2n2y ̄ ∑∑|yi − yj| no weak yes 0, n−1
n
rel. mean dev M  1
n ∑
yi
y ̄ − 1 no just fails yes 0,21 − 1
n 





no fails yes 0,





no fails yes 0,




Figure 4: Properties of diﬀerent measures of disparity, source: Cowell (1995).
disparity by the Theil-contribution of the disparity determining variables like























i = α + β1THK
i + β2THHC
i ... (23)
While in the standard income and growth regression only the existence of a
slope between the dependent and independent variable is important, explaining
disparity requires an additional information. As disparity measured in distances
is the target, the distance from the mean must be included in the measurement
concept. The Theil concept considers this requirement with the help of an
appropriate weighting scheme.
Further, if we apply the theoretical model above to standard income and
growth regression analysis, we can identify income and growth determining fac-
tors. However, we do not know to what extend each of these factors is respon-
sible for disparity. Even if a factor is highly income determining, it does not
necessarily drive disparity if the diﬀerences in this factor are small among the
regions. This is particularly obvious in case of panel data. If a determining
factor is equally abundant in two provinces, and growing at the same rate, it
may clearly contribute to income growth but not to disparity.
Therefore, we choose an estimation approach where the Theil-index-contribution
of income in each province is determined by the Theil-index contribution of eachChina’s provincial disparities 18
explanatory variable of income derived from the theoretical model above (see
(23)).
5 Panel data analysis of provincial disparity
For the empirical study we suggest a panel data analysis. More speciﬁcally, our
point of departure is a simple individual eﬀects model of the form
Yi,t = α + βX0
i,t + ui,t (24)
where Yi,t is the dependent variable and X0
i,t is a set of explanatory variables.
This method allows for an inclusion of individual eﬀects for each province. Hence
uit = μi + εit denotes the disturbance term that is composed of the individual
eﬀect μi and stochastic white noise disturbance εit.27 Depending on the assump-
tion that μi and the explanatory variables X0
i,t are uncorrelated, the random
eﬀects estimator should be used, whereas if the speciﬁce ﬀects μi and X0
i,t are
correlated the ﬁxed eﬀects estimator may be appropriate. The Hausman speciﬁ-
cation test is a test of whether the ﬁxed or random eﬀects model should be used.
It tests the null hypothesis that the ﬁxed eﬀects model and the random eﬀects
model estimators do not diﬀer substantially. If this hypothesis is accepted, the
random eﬀects estimator is consistent and more eﬃcient and should be favoured
over the ﬁxed eﬀects estimator. If it is rejected, there is a correlation between
μi and X0
i,t so that the random eﬀects model is inconsistent and the ﬁxed eﬀects
model is the appropriate choice.
In order to analyze the determinants of inequality within China, it is nec-
essary to use provincial data to consider the provinces’ heterogeneity. Our
data set covers the period 1991-200428 and includes annual data for 28 Chinese
provinces, autonomous provinces, and municipalities. These are Beijing, Tian-
jin, Hebei, Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, Guang-
dong, Shanxi, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Anhui, Jiagxi, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, In-
ner Mongolia, Guangxi, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai,
Ningxia and Xinjiang. Due to missing values the provinces Tibet and Hainan are
excluded. Constructing our data set, we have used new income data reported
by Hsueh and Li (1999) as well as various (some?) sources of Chinese oﬃcial
statistics provided by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). These are the
27In our case a LM-test for the presence of individual eﬀects rejects the hypothesis that
μi =0so we start we include an individual eﬀect.
28The choice of the period makes sense for two reasons. First, the early 1990s saw the
latest wave of international integration policy in China. Also in the early 1990s the Chinese
government started to prepare for WTO accession and a further opening up of the economy.
Second, we want to focus on the period where China’s inequality increased, as can be seen in
the development of the Gini ceﬃcient and the Theil index this period started in 1991. Third,
with respect to some important indicators some provinces would have had to be excluded if
the time period had been expanded to earlier years.China’s provincial disparities 19
China Statistical Yearbook (CSY) from 1996-2004 and the China Compendium
of Statistics 1949-2004. In the following, the variables are accurately described.
The basic goal is to explain provincial disparity in China. Moreover, dispari-
ties in provincial income are caused by disparities in income determining factors.
In this context inequality is measured by the Theil index, and the dependant
variable is deﬁned as the provincial contribution to the country’s inequality. To
account for the distribution of the explanatory variables we calculate the cor-
responding Theil indices for all inequality factors and compute analogically the
provincial contribution to those indices. Hence, we try to explain a province’s
contribution to income inequality with the help of the share of inequality of
other factors. Our estimation equation is directly derived from the theoretical
model presented above. The general equation of motion for the above model
translates into the estimation equations (20) with the following speciﬁcation
TH_GDPi,t = α + β1TH_Ci,t + β2TH_HCi,t + β3TH_Ti,t (25)
+β4TH_FDIi,t + β5TH_GOV 1i,t + β6TH_GOV 2i,t
+β7TH_HIGHWAYi,t + μi + εi,t
where TH_GDPi,t denotes the contribution of province i to the country’s in-
come inequality and TH_Ci,t, TH_HCi,t, TH_Ti,t, TH_FDIi,t, TH_GOV 1i,t,
TH_GOV 2i,t and TH_HIGHWAYi,t are the corresponding contributions to
inequality in physical capital, human capital, trade, foreign direct investment,
government expenditure and infrastructure measured by highways.
The notation of the estimation equation translates as follows:
Theil Index Contribution of Income: TH_GDPi,t : TH_GDPi,t de-
notes the contribution of province i to the country’s Theil index. The provincial
income used for the calculation is obtained from Hsueh and Li (1999) cover-
ing the period 1991-1995 and from various issues of the Statistical Yearbook of
China for 1996-2004. GDP per capita expressed in current prices (yuan) has
been deﬂated with 1995 as the base year.
Theil Index Contribution of Capital: TH_Ki,t : TH_Ki,t denotes the
corresponding Theil index of the real capital stock per capita. The real physical
capital stock for all provinces is estimated by using the standard perpetual
inventory approach. It is accumulated according to
Kt+1 = It +( 1− δ)Kt (26)
where Kt and Kt+1 is the capital stock of year t and t+1, It denotes investment,
and δ the depreciation rate. The investment series used is gross ﬁxed capital
formation and is taken at current prices. It is taken from Hsueh and Li (1999)
and from the Chinese Statistical Yearbooks. Like Miyamoto and Liu (2005) we
assume that the depreciation rate δ is 5 percent for all provinces. As weight forChina’s provincial disparities 20
the initial capital stocks for each province, we use the average ratio of provincial
GDP to national GDP for each province over the period 1952-1977. Following
Wang and Yao (2003) we assume their estimate of 26609.67 billion yuan as
the initial real capital stock for 1977 at the national level. By multiplying
this initial capital stock with the provincial weights we derive the initial capital
stock for each province. In order to calculate the real capital stock we use a new
investment deﬂator provided by Hsueh and Li (1999) for the period 1978-1995
and combine it with the price index for ﬁxed asset investment for the period
1996-2004.
Theil Index Contribution of Human capital: TH_HCi,t : TH_HCi,t
is the Theil Index contribution of human capital. Enrolment in higher education
as log of the share in the total population is the proxy for human capital. We
obtained the data from the China Compendium of Statistics 1949-2004.
Theil Index Contribution of Trade: TH_Ti,t : We use the log of trade
calculated as the sum of imports and exports in GDP as a measure for eco-
nomic integration. The data is taken from the China Compendium of Statistics
1949-2004. We again compute the Theil index contribution TH_Ti,t for each
province.
Theil Index Contribution of FDI: TH_FDIi,t : The second variable mea-
suring the economic integration is foreign direct investment measured as the log
of FDI in GDP taken from the China Compendium of Statistics 1949-2004. Be-
cause FDI data is available only in yuan we transform the data into US dollars
using the national exchange rate for each year reported by the National Bureau
of Statistics. TH_FDIi,t denotes the Theil index share of this variable.
Theil Index Contribution of Government Expenditure: TH_GOV 1i,t,
TH_GOV 2i,t : Two variables can indicate the eﬀect of government expen-
diture on income inequality. The ﬁrst is the Theil contribution of the share
of local government general expenditure in administration (TH_GOV 1i,t)a n d
the second is the corresponding contribution of the ratio of local government
general expenditure in culture, education, science and public health to GDP
(TH_GOV 2i,t). Again, the source of the data is the China Compendium of
Statistics 1949-2004.
Theil Index Contribution of Highway: TH_HIGHWAYi,t : We use the
Theil index contribution of the highway length per squared kilometer (TH_HIGHWAYi,t)
as a proxy for the inequality in infrastructure. We obtain the data for the high-
way length and the area in square kilometers from the China Compendium of
Statistics 1949-2004.China’s provincial disparities 21
6 Estimation results
T h er e s u l t so ft h ee s t i m a t e sa r es u m m a r i z e di nt a b l e1 .I ts h o w st h er e s u l t sf o r
the ﬁxed eﬀects estimator for the period 1991-2004. We use the Hausman test
for the appropriate choice between random and ﬁxed eﬀects. With a p-value of
0.00 the test rejects the hypothesis that the random and ﬁxed eﬀects estimators
do not diﬀer substantially, so there is a correlation between μi and X0
i,t and
the random eﬀects model is inconsistent. Hence, the ﬁxed eﬀects model is the
appropriate choice.29







TH_GOV 1i,t -0.003 (0.002)




Hausman test: chi2(7)=42.97 Prob>chi2=0.00
N o t e :* ,* *a n d* * *d e n o t es i g n i ﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
Looking at table 1, most explanatory variables enter with the sign predicted from
the model, except human capital. Hence, the major ﬁndings of the estimates
suggest that both mean income but also the typical growth determinants tend
to have a positive impact on inequality. Furthermore, it is the success of the
eastern provinces that to a high degree drives the inequality:
1. Domestic sources of Inequality:
• Controlling for other explanatory variables the coeﬃcient for the in-
equality contribution of physical capital is highly signiﬁcant and has
the strongest positive eﬀect on inequality. This result indicates that
29To avoid the problem of possible endogeneity of the explanatory variables we also run
a system GMM estimation. The coeﬃcient values are similar and conﬁrm the FE results.
Merely the signiﬁcation of human capital rise to a 5% level and those of trade and GOV2 to
a1 %l e v e l ,F D Ii sn o ts i g n i ﬁcant.
We tested for the presence of multicolinearity calculating variance inﬂation factors (VIFs).
VIF values in excess of 10 often indicate a multicolinearity problem. The VIF values for the
independant variables ranged from 1.5 to 7.8 with a mean VIF of 3.5, this indicates that there
is no serious multicolinearity problem.
The Breusch Pagan/ Cook-Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity rejects the hypothesis of
constant variance, so we use robust standard errors.China’s provincial disparities 22
inequality in China is not only a phenomenon caused by foreign ﬁrms
investing in selected provinces of the country. The growth process has
strong and important domestic components. Such as in the case of
income inequality physical capital inequality shows the same progress
and is also driven by few coastal provinces namely Shanghai, Beijing
and Tinajin.
• The same provinces account for a high fraction of the inequality in
Human Capital. However in contrast to the income inequality human
capital inequality is continuously decreasing over the period 1991-
2004. The coeﬃcient shows no signiﬁcant impact on the dependant
variable.
• The contributions of the inequality variables of government expendi-
ture show a contrary picture. Here, inequality is driven by completely
other provinces than income inequality. The inequality in expendi-
ture in administration is mainly driven by the provinces Quinghai
and Gouizhou. Expenditure in culture, education, science and pub-
lic wealth are smaller and distributed more evenly. The provinces
which are responsible for the income inequality enter with a negative
contribution to the expenditure inequality. Both coeﬃcients have a
negative impact on the dependant variable. However, only the eﬀect
of the second variable is signiﬁcant.
2. Openness and Inequality
• The coeﬃcient of the inequality contribution of trade is signiﬁcant
and has a positive eﬀect on income inequality. This result supports
the ﬁndings of Barro (1999) and Spilimbergo et. al. (1999) that sug-
gest that trade is signiﬁcantly positively associated with inequality.
• Openness inequality measured by the inequality contribution of FDI
is also signiﬁcant but shows a contrary eﬀect on income inequality.
In comparison to the trade variable this might be due to the more
even distribution of the Theil index to the provinces, so that driving
provinces of income inequality have not an accentuated impact on
FDI inequality. Furthermore, in contrast to the income and trade
inequality FDI inequality shows a decreasing development.
3. Infrastructure and Inequality
• Infrastructure inequality measured by the Theil index contribution
of highway length per squared kilometers is highly signiﬁcant and
shows a strong eﬀect on income inequality, so that a high share in
infrastructure inequality leads to a high share in income inequality.China’s provincial disparities 23
7 Summary and conclusion
The paper explains the growth — inequality nexus for China’s provinces. The
theoretical model of provincial development consists of two regions and studies
the interactions of a mutual development process. Due to positive externalities,
incoming trade and FDI induce imitation and hence productivity growth. The
regional government can inﬂuence the economy by changing international trans-
action costs and providing the public infrastructure. Due to mobile domestic
capital disparity eﬀects are reinforced. The implications of the theoretical model
are tested. As the central intention of the paper is to explain provincial disparity
we directly relate income disparity (indicated by the contribution to the income
Theil index) to the disparity of selected income determining factors (indicated
by the contribution to each other Theil index). We examine the determinants of
income and inequality for 28 Chinese provinces over the period 1991-2004 and
apply ﬁxed eﬀects panel estimation. Our analysis is based on revised GDP and
investment data from Hsueh and Li (1999) and various sources of Chinese oﬃ-
cial statistics provided by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). The results
conﬁrm the theoretical framework and suggest a direct linkage between the fac-
tors that determine regional income and regional disparity. More speciﬁc, it is
apparent that trade, foreign and domestic capital as well as government expen-
diture have an impact on the provincial inequality. Moreover, it is the success of
the coastal regions and hence potentially geography with the low international
transaction costs that drives the provincial inequality of China.
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Appendix 1b: Determining export values by a household decision and
international capital costs:
max : U = Cλ Im
1−λ,















i = pi(1 − τex
i )




= εi =( 1− λ)[1− (1 − τex
i )β](1− γi)
Appendix 2: Steady state determination and reactions of ω∗
i when Hi,K i,
τi, τex
i and γ are changing:






















































































i − 1 < 0
as Hi and Ki are assumed to be suﬀ.s m a l l













1−β − ω(t) see (4)












i . see (6)
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Properties of the curve:
lim
K1→0
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i > 0 for identical provinces












































































































































































































2 < 0= ⇒
˙ Ω(t)
Ω(t)
< 0 see (13)
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Appendix 4a: Determine domestic interest rate:
πi =( 1 − γi)yi − iiKi − ρiHi






















































Derive the interest parity curve:
i1 = i2
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Slope of the interest parity curve :




























































































properties of the curve:
lim
K1→0








































































































Appendix 4d: Relative slope of the ﬁnal development position and the
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δ − δβ < α− αβ
δ<α
Appendix 5: Equilibrium reaction of local capital allocation. As we start












































































































< 0China’s provincial disparities 33
9A n n o t a i o n
The annotations are an extended appendix. They are attached for the conve-
nience of the referee to easily check the mathematical discussion.





























































Annotation 1b: Determining export values by a household decision and
international capital costs:
max : U = Cλ Im
1−λ,
s.t. :0 = y(1 − γi) − τirFi − Ci − pi(1 − τex
i )Im i




yi − Ci − pi(1 − τex
i )Im i
0=[ 1 − (1 − τex































= p(1 − τex
i )
Ci − λCi = λp(1 − τex
i )Im i
Ci − λCi = λ[[1 − (1 − τex
i )β](1− γi)yi − Ci]




= εi =( 1− λ)[1− (1 − τex
i )β](1− γi)
Annotation 2: Steady state determination and reactions of ω∗
i when Hi,K i,
τi, τex
i and γ are changing:China’s provincial disparities 34















































































































































































i − 1 < 0
as Hi and Ki are assumed to be suﬀ.s m a l l













1−β − ω(t) see (4)
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=
δ(1 − β − α)
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Properties of the curve:
lim
K1→0
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i > 0 for identical provinces












































































































































































































2 < 0= ⇒
˙ Ω(t)
Ω(t)
< 0 see (13)
Annotation 2d: Reaction of the ﬁnal development curve ΩD, dΩD
dτ1 , dΩD
dτex
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Annotation 4a: Determine domestic interest rate:
πi =( 1 − γi)yi − iiKi − ρiHi






















































Derive the interest parity curve:
i1 = i2
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properties of the curve:
lim
K1→0








































































































Annotation 4d: Relative slope of the ﬁnal development position and the
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δ − δβ − δα < α− αβ − αδ
δ − δβ < α− αβ
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δ<α
Annotation 5: Equilibrium reaction of local capital allocation. As we start
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